Directory of Research and Expertise

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Research Summary and Profile

Research interests:

Neuroscience, Philosophy, Social Sciences

Publication Details

Related publications/articles:

Date	Details
11-Apr-2024	Defining key concepts for mental state attribution Journal articles F. Quesque, I. Apperly, R. Baillargeon, S. Baron-Cohen, C. Becchio, H. Bekkering, et al. (2024) Communications Psychology 2 ,1, Pages 29 DOI: 10.1038/s44271-024-00077-6 The terminology used in discussions on mental state attribution is extensive and lacks consistency. In the current paper, experts from various disciplines collaborate to introduce a shared set of concepts and make recommendations regarding future use.
01-Jan-2024	Federated inference and belief sharing Journal articles <p>This paper concerns the distributed intelligence or federated inference that emerges under belief-sharing among agents who share a common world&mdash;and world model. Imagine, for example, several animals keeping a lookout for predators. Their collective surveillance rests upon being able to communicate their beliefs&mdash;about what they see&mdash;among themselves. But, how is this possible? Here, we show how all the necessary components arise from minimising free energy. We use numerical studies to simulate the generation, acquisition and emergence of language in synthetic agents. Specifically, we consider inference, learning and selection as minimising the variational free energy of posterior (i.e., Bayesian) beliefs about the states, parameters and structure of generative models, respectively. The common theme&mdash;that attends these optimisation processes&mdash;is the selection of actions that minimise expected free energy, leading to active inference, learning and model selection (a.k.a., structure learning). We first illustrate the role of communication in resolving uncertainty about the latent states of a partially observed world, on which agents have complementary perspectives. We then consider the acquisition of the requisite language&mdash;entailed by a likelihood mapping from an agent&#39;s beliefs to their overt expression (e.g., speech)&mdash;showing that language can be transmitted across generations by active learning. Finally, we show that language is an emergent property of free energy minimisation, when agents operate within the same econiche. We conclude with a discussion of various perspectives on these phenomena; ranging from cultural niche construction, through federated learning, to the emergence of complexity in ensembles of self-organising systems.</p><p>DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105500</p>
01-Dec-2023	The mystery of the brain-culture interface Journal articles C. D. Frith and U. Frith (2023). Trends Cogn Sci 26, 12, P1023-1025 Nature and culture work together to shape who we are. We are embedded in culture and are profoundly influenced by what those around us say and do. The interface between minds occurs at the level of explicit metacognition, which is at the top of our brain&#39;s control hierarchy. But how do our brains do this?< DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2022.08.013
20-Sep-2023	What Makes Us Social? Monographs Frith, C. and Frith, U. (2023) What Makes Us Social? (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press). ISBN electronic: 9780262375498 A deep dive into the social mind-brain, examining the processes we share with other social animals and illuminating those that are uniquely human. What Makes Us Social? is a scholarly but accessible exploration of the underlying processes that make humans the most social species on the planet. Chris and Uta Frith, pioneers in the field of cognitive neuroscience, review the many forms of social behavior that we humans share with other animals and examine the special form that only humans possess, including its dark side. These uniquely human abilities allow us to reflect on our behavior and share these reflections with other people, which in turn enables us to reason why we do things and to exert some control over our automatic behaviors. As a result, we can learn cooperatively with others and create and value cultural artifacts that survive through the generations. Going beyond how we come to know ourselves and understand the minds of others, Frith and Frith investigate how we adapt mutually to make social interactions work. This book stands out in its application of a computational framework—one that lies at the intersection of psychology and artificial intelligence—to key concepts of social cognition, such as empathy, trust, group identity, and reputation management. Ultimately, What Makes Us Social? is a profound examination of the ways we communicate, cooperate, share, and compete with other humans and how these capabilities define us as a species.
21-Aug-2023	Consciousness beyond the human case Journal articles J. LeDoux, J. Birch, K. Andrews, N. S. Clayton, N. D. Daw, C. Frith, et al. (2023) Current Biology 33,16 Pages R832-R840 There is growing interest in the relationship been AI and consciousness. Joseph LeDoux and Jonathan Birch thought it would be a good moment to put some of the big questions in this area to some leading experts. The challenge of addressing the questions they raised was taken up by Kristin Andrews, Nicky Clayton, Nathaniel Daw, Chris Frith, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters, Susan Schneider, Anil Seth, Thomas Suddendorf, and Marie Vanderkerckhoeve. DOI: 10.1016/j.cub.2023.06.067
07-Mar-2023	Consciousness, (meta)cognition, and culture Journal articles C. D. Frith (2023) Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 76, 8 Pages 1711-1723 Our conscious experience is determined by a combination of top-down processes (e.g., prior beliefs) and bottom-up processes (e.g., sensations). The balance between these two processes depends on estimates of their reliability (precision), so that the estimate considered more reliable is given more weight. We can modify these estimates at the metacognitive level, changing the relative weights of priors and sensations. This enables us, for example, to direct our attention to weak stimuli. But there is a cost to this malleability. For example, excessive weighting of top-down processes, as in schizophrenia, can lead to perceiving things that are not there and believing things that are not true. It is only at the top of the brain?s cognitive hierarchy that metacognitive control becomes conscious. At this level, our beliefs concern complex, abstract entities with which we have limited direct experience. Estimates of the precision of such beliefs are more uncertain and more malleable. However, at this level, we do not need to rely on our own limited experience. We can rely instead on the experiences of others. Explicit metacognition plays a unique role, enabling us to share our experiences. We acquire our beliefs about the world from our immediate social group and from our wider culture. And the same sources provide us with better estimates of the precision of these beliefs. Our confidence in our high-level beliefs is heavily influenced by culture at the expense of direct experience. DOI: 10.1177/17470218231164502
11-Jun-2022	Reputation matters Articles Frith, U., Frith, C.D., and Frith, A. 2022. Reputation matters. Psychologist 35, 34-38.
03-Mar-2022	Two Heads: Where Two Neuroscientists Explore How Our Brains Work with Other Brains Monographs Frith, U., Frith, C.D., Frith, A., and Locke, D. 2022. Two Heads: Where Two Neuroscientists Explore How Our Brains Work with Other Brains London: Bloomsbury.
12-Jul-2021	Awareness and confidence in perceptual decision-making Journal articles Skewes, J., Frith, C., and Overgaard, M. 2021. Awareness and confidence in perceptual decision-making. Brain Multiphysics, 100030.
12-Apr-2021	Helping the waiter to hold his tray: Rigid haptic linkage promotes inter-personal motor coordination Journal articles Ferreiro, D.N., Frith, C.D., and Bahrami, B. 2021. Helping the waiter to hold his tray: Rigid haptic linkage promotes inter-personal motor coordination. QJEP 74, 1784-1790.
15-Jan-2021	Mapping mentalising in the brain Chapters Frith, C.D., and Frith, U. 2020. Mapping mentalising in the brain. In The Neural Bases of Mentalizing ed. K. Ochsner, and M. Gilead. Springer Press.
18-May-2020	Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch Journal articles Dezecache, G., Frith, C. D. & Deroy, O. (2020). Pandemics and the great evolutionary mismatch. Current Biology 30, R1-R3.
01-May-2020	Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition Journal articles Heyes, C., Bang, D., Shea, N., Frith, C. D. & Fleming, S. M. (2020). Knowing Ourselves Together: The Cultural Origins of Metacognition. Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
23-Apr-2020	I haven’ta clue!-Expectations based on repetitions and hints facilitate perceptual experience of ambiguous images Journal articles Hertz, U., Blakemore, C. & Frith, C. (2020). I haven’ta clue!-Expectations based on repetitions and hints facilitate perceptual experience of ambiguous images. J Exp Psychol:
31-Jul-2018	Volition and the Brain – Revisiting a Classic Experimental Study Journal articles in Trends in Neurosciences, Elsevier
25-May-2018	The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis Journal articles in Biological Psychiatry, Elsevier
09-Mar-2018	Hyper- and Hypomentalizing in Patients with First-Episode Schizophrenia Journal articles in Schizophrenia Review, Oxford University Press
19-Dec-2017	Neural computations underpinning the strategic management of influence in advice giving Journal articles  in Nature Communications, Uri Hertz, Stefano Palminteri, Silvia Brunetti, Cecilie Olesen, Chris D Frith & Bahador Bahrami
02-Oct-2017	Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight Journal articles in Neural Computation, Volume 29 Issue 10, MIT Press
11-Aug-2017	Deficits and Pathologies Chapters in Companion to Cogntive Science, Wiley
01-Aug-2017	Making better decisions in groups Journal articles Royal Society open science
15-Jul-2015	Active inference, communication and hermeneutics. Journal articles Friston, K.J., and C.D. Frith. 2015. Active inference, communication and hermeneutics. Cortex. 68:129-143. Hermeneutics refers to interpretation and translation of text (typically ancient scriptures) but also applies to verbal and non-verbal communication. In a psychological setting it nicely frames the problem of inferring the intended content of a communication. In this paper, we offer a solution to the problem of neural hermeneutics based upon active inference. In active inference, action fulfils predictions about how we will behave (e.g., predicting we will speak). Crucially, these predictions can be used to predict both self and others - during speaking and listening respectively. Active inference mandates the suppression of prediction errors by updating an internal model that generates predictions - both at fast timescales (through perceptual inference) and slower timescales (through perceptual learning). If two agents adopt the same model, then - in principle - they can predict each other and minimise their mutual prediction errors. Heuristically, this ensures they are singing from the same hymn sheet. This paper builds upon recent work on active inference and communication to illustrate perceptual learning using simulated birdsongs. Our focus here is the neural hermeneutics implicit in learning, where communication facilitates long-term changes in generative models that are trying to predict each other. In other words, communication induces perceptual learning and enables others to (literally) change our minds and vice versa.
01-Jul-2014	Frontal alpha oscillations distinguish leaders from followers: multivariate decoding of mutually interacting brains Journal articles Konvalinka, I., M. Bauer, C. Stahlhut, L.K. Hansen, A. Roepstorff, and C.D. Frith. 2014. Frontal alpha oscillations distinguish leaders from followers: multivariate decoding of mutually interacting brains. Neuroimage. 94:79-88. Successful social interactions rely upon the abilities of two or more people to mutually exchange information in real-time, while simultaneously adapting to one another. The neural basis of social cognition has mostly been investigated in isolated individuals, and more recently using two-person paradigms to quantify the neuronal dynamics underlying social interaction. While several studies have shown the relevance of understanding complementary and mutually adaptive processes, the neural mechanisms underlying such coordinative behavioral patterns during joint action remain largely unknown. Here, we employed a synchronized finger-tapping task while measuring dual-EEG from pairs of human participants who either mutually adjusted to each other in an interactive task or followed a computer metronome. Neurophysiologically, the interactive condition was characterized by a stronger suppression of alpha and low-beta oscillations over motor and frontal areas in contrast to the non-interactive computer condition. A multivariate analysis of two-brain activity to classify interactive versus non-interactive trials revealed asymmetric patterns of the frontal alpha-suppression in each pair, during both task anticipation and execution, such that only one member showed the frontal component. Analysis of the behavioral data showed that this distinction coincided with the leader-follower relationship in 8/9 pairs, with the leaders characterized by the stronger frontal alpha-suppression. This suggests that leaders invest more resources in prospective planning and control. Hence our results show that the spontaneous emergence of leader-follower relationships in dyadic interactions can be predicted from EEG recordings of brain activity prior to and during interaction. Furthermore, this emphasizes the importance of investigating complementarity in joint action.
20-Jun-2014	The cultural evolution of mind reading Journal articles  Heyes, C.M., and C.D. Frith. 2014. The cultural evolution of mind reading. Science. 344:1243091. It is not just a manner of speaking: "Mind reading," or working out what others are thinking and feeling, is markedly similar to print reading. Both of these distinctly human skills recover meaning from signs, depend on dedicated cortical areas, are subject to genetically heritable disorders, show cultural variation around a universal core, and regulate how people behave. But when it comes to development, the evidence is conflicting. Some studies show that, like learning to read print, learning to read minds is a long, hard process that depends on tuition. Others indicate that even very young, nonliterate infants are already capable of mind reading. Here, we propose a resolution to this conflict. We suggest that infants are equipped with neurocognitive mechanisms that yield accurate expectations about behavior ("automatic" or "implicit" mind reading), whereas "explicit" mind reading, like literacy, is a culturally inherited skill; it is passed from one generation to the next by verbal instruction.
14-Apr-2014	Supra-personal cognitive control and metacognition Journal articles  Shea, N.J., A. Boldt, D. Bang, N. Yeung, C. Heyes, and C.D. Frith. 2014. Supra-Personal Cognitive Control and Metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci. 18:186-193. The human mind is extraordinary in its ability not merely to respond to events as they unfold, but to adapt its own operation in pursuit of its agenda. This 'cognitive control' can be achieved through simple interactions among sensorimotor processes, and through interactions in which one sensorimotor process represents a property of another in an implicit, unconscious way. So why does the human mind also represent properties of cognitive processes in an explicit way, enabling us to think and say 'I'm sure' or 'I'm doubtful'? We suggest that 'system 2 metacognition' is for supra-personal cognitive control. It allows metacognitive information to be broadcast, and thereby to coordinate the sensorimotor systems of two or more agents involved in a shared task.
16-Mar-2014	Action, agency and responsibility Journal articles  Frith, C.D. 2014. Action, agency and responsibility. Neuropsychologia. 55:137-142. In a series of experiments Marc Jeannerod revealed that we have very little awareness of the details and causes of our actions. We are, however, vividly aware of being in control of our actions and this gives us a sense of responsibility. These feelings arise, first, from intentional binding which creates a perception of agency, linking an intentional action to its outcome and, second, from the counterfactual reasoning that we could have chosen some other action. These feelings of responsibility play a critical role in creating social cohesion since they allow people to be held to account for deliberate antisocial behaviour. Jeannerod's studies also showed that we are unaware of how little we know about our actions and so are happy to make up stories about the nature and causes of our behaviour. These stories often do not correspond with the underlying cognitive and neural processes, but they can be changed through instructions and through discussion with others. Our experience of responsibility for action emerges during our upbringing through exposure to our culture. This creates consensus about the causes of behaviour, but not necessarily accuracy.

Publications available on SAS-space:

Date

Details

Jan-2018

Learning Rapidly about the Relevance of Visual Cues Requires Conscious Awareness PeerReviewed Humans have been shown capable of performing many cognitive tasks using information of which they are not consciously aware. This raises questions about what role consciousness actually plays in cognition. Here, we explored whether participants can learn cue-target contingencies in an attentional learning task when the cues were presented below the level of conscious awareness, and how this differs from learning about conscious cues. Participants’ manual (Experiment 1) and saccadic (Experiment 2) response speeds were influenced by both conscious and unconscious cues. However, participants were only able to adapt to reversals of the cue-target contingencies (Experiment 1) or changes in the reliability of the cues (Experiment 2) when consciously aware of the cues. Therefore, although visual cues can be processed unconsciously, learning about cues over a few trials requires conscious awareness of them. Finally, we discuss implications for cognitive theories of consciousness.

Additional Publications

Relevant Events

Related events:

Date	Details
20-Jun-2022	Two Heads: Where two neuroscientists explore how our brains work with other brains York Festival of Ideas, 20th June 2022. Uta, Chris and Alex Frith and Dan Locke talk about Two Heads: Where two neuroscientists explore how our brains work with other brains
01-Mar-2022	Two heads: A exploration of how our brains work with other brains Royal Institution, 1st March 2022. Uta Frith, Chris Frith and Alex Frith, and Daniel Locke, Two heads: A exploration of how our brains work with other brains

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